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Grime and punishment: job insecurity and wage arrears in the Russian Federation

Lehmann, Hartmut; Wadsworth, Jonathan; & Acquisti, Alessandro. (1999). Grime and punishment: job insecurity and wage arrears in the Russian Federation. Journal of Comparative Economics, 27(4), 595-617.

Lehmann, Hartmut; Wadsworth, Jonathan; & Acquisti, Alessandro. (1999). Grime and punishment: job insecurity and wage arrears in the Russian Federation. Journal of Comparative Economics, 27(4), 595-617.

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Using information from two complementary household survey data sets, we show that the dominant form of labor market adjustment in the Russian transition process has been the delayed receipt of wages. More than half the work force is experiencing some form of disruption of their pay. Wage arrears are found across the private, state, and budgetary sectors. Workers in the metropolitan center are less affected by delayed and incomplete wage payments than are workers in the provinces. There is less evidence that individual characteristics contribute much toward the incidence of wage arrears, but the persistence of arrears is concentrated on a subset of the working population. We show that workers can only exercise the exit option of a job quit from a firm not paying wages in full or on time if the outside labor market is sufficiently dynamic.




JOUR



Lehmann, Hartmut
Wadsworth, Jonathan
Acquisti, Alessandro



1999


Journal of Comparative Economics

27

4

595-617







10.1006/jcec.1999.1616



242